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table. Such a mistake could not occur however on the part of a
careful observer. Even if inexperienced he would not think that
he had made a n~w discovery apid that therefore the authorities
were all in the wrong.
From another case of Professor Freer's at the hospital, I have
made two tables of 56 corpuscles. These average 3--,j and 'g
of an inch respectively.
In order to understand clearly the 'distinctive difference in
this matter of measurement of blood corpuscles, let us analyze
two cases, and see how far we could trust the verdict which might
be based upon them. For this purpose I will take one case in
of an inch,
which the average measurement shall be the -ru
the other . It will be seen that if thirty-two hundred of
The first were placed in a straight line they would occupy the
space of an inch in length, while in the other case it would take
just one hundred more .to fill the same space; now by multiplying the first number into itself we get 10,240,000, the number occupying a square inch of surface, while in the second example it would take 10,890,000 to occupy the same area. Twelve
of the first placed in a right line magnified 2000 diameters, would
give six inches and a quarter as the length of the line, while the
other twelve would show to the eye a line measuring just six inches
in length, a difference appreciable by every one. Even one-half
of this difference, produced by a magnifying power of 1000 diameters, would be clearly recognisable.
R. U. PIPER, M.D.
CHICAGO.

RECENT AMERICAN

DECISIONS.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maasachusetts.
WINFIELD S. PARTRIDGE v. HERMIONE HOOD.
At common law it was illegal to compound a misdemeanor as well as a felony.
In Massachusetts a statute having provided when the prosecution of a misdemeanor may be compromised by leave of court, a compromise in such a prosecution is illegal unless such consent of court appears.
CONTRACT upon the following agreement, signed by the defendant, and dated October 5th 1874:"In consideration of one dollar and other good and valid consideration to me paid, I hereby agree, upon the delivery to me
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and in my name, within three days from the date hereof, of a quitclaim deed, conveying the land described in a mortgage deed to
Winfield S. Partridge given by Edward K. Iood, said quit-claim
deed to be given by said Partridge and said land to be free of all
encumbrances except a mortgage now held by the South Scituate
Savings Bank for $1200, covering a portion of said land, to give
said Partridge a first mortgage deed for $1250, payable in two
years at eight per centum per annum, interest payable semi-annually, on my homestead estate situated on Essex street, Lynn,
Mass. And also a power of sale first mortgage upon a portion
of said land to be conveyed to me by said Partridge for $1000,
payable in two years with interest thereon payable semi-annually
at the rate of eight per centum per annum; said land being the
westerly half of said land described in said mortgage from Edward
K. Hood to W. S. Partridge."
The answer averred that the consideration of the contract was
an agreement on the part of the plaintiff to stop a criminal prosecution against Edward K. Hood, the defendant's son.
At the trial in the Superior Court, before BAcON, J., without
a jury, the following facts appeared: In August 1874, a complaint
was entered in the Police Court of Lynn, against Edward K. Hood,
for having mortgaged to the plaintiff in this action certain real
estate in Lynn, without informing him of an existing encumbrance
upon it. On this complaint, Hood was bound over to answer at the
then next term of the Superior Court for the county of Essex. The
land mentioned was the same as that referred to in the agreement
declared upon. Upon the day before the grand jury met, one
Silsbee, the plaintiff's agent, went to the house of the defendant,
and, according to his own testimony, told her that if she would
purchase the land of the plaintiff at what it cost him, he having
sold under his mortgage and bought it in, "1the matter," meaning
the prosecution, " could undoubtedly be arranged." Under this
inducement the defendant signed the contract. The defendant testified that she signed the contract to save her son from jail, and
that Silsbee told her "the prosecution could be stayed." It further
appeared that at the time of the trial the complaint was still pending in the Superior Court, never having been heard by the grand
jury, and that no acknowledgment of satisfaction had been made
by the plaintiff in court or elsewhere of the complaint; that the
amount agreed to be paid by the defendant for the land was the
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precise amount due by her son to the plaintiff at the date of the
contract, and that the plaintiff tLereby gave up to the defendant
all the security he had for the amount.
The plaintiff contended that the arrangement testified to might
be made under the Gen. Stats., c. 171, § 28, as preliminary to an
acknowledgment of satisfaction, and that, at common law, such
a misdemeanor might be compounded by the party injured if he
received no more than his damages by the injury.
The judge found as a fact that the written agreement declared
on was entered into by the defendant for the purpose of compounding said complaint, ruled that it was illegal and void, and
ordered judgment for the defendant. The plaintiff alleged exceptions.
B. B. Hfarmon, for the plaintiff.

.D. 0. Allen, for the defendant.
GRAY, C. J.-The reason that a private agreement, made in
consideration of the suppression of a prosecution for crime, is
illegal, is that it tends to benefit an individual at the expense of
defeating the course of public justice. The doctrine has never
been doubted as applied to felonies, and the English authorities
before our revolution extended it to all crimes: 2 West Symb.,
Compromise & Arbitrement, § 33; Horton v. Benson, 1 Freem.
204 ; Bac. Ab., Arbitrament g Award, A.; Johnson v. Ogilby, 3
P. Wins. 277 ; and especially the register's book cited by Mr. Cox
in a note to p. 278: Collins v. Blantern, 2 Wils. 341 ; 4 Bl. Com.
363, 864. An appeal-of mayhem could be barred by arbitrament,
or accord and satisfaction, or release of all personal actions,
because it was the suit of the appellant and not of the crown, and
subjected the appellee to damages only, like an action of trespass: Blake's 0a8e, 6 Rep. 43 b, 44 c; 2 Hawk., c. 23, §§ 24, 25.
Some confusion was introduced into the English law upon this
subject by the rulings of Lord KENYON; Kyd on Awards (Am.
ed.) 64-68; l)rage v. .Tbberson, 2 Esp. 643; Fallowes v. Taylor,
Peake Ad. Cas. 155; s. c. 7 T. R. 475, and by Mr. Justice LE
BLANC'S suggestion of a distinction between a prosecution for a
public misdemeanor and one for a private injury to the prosecutor:
Edgeombe v. Bodd, 5 East 294, 303; s. c. I Smith 515, 520.
This confusion was not wholly removed by the opinions of Lord
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in Edgeombe v. Rodd, 5 East 294, 802; in
Wallace v. Hardacre, 1 Camp. 45, 46; in Poole v. Bonsfield, Id.
55, and in Beeley v. Wingfield, 11 East 46, 48; of Ch. J. GIBBS
in Baker r. Townshend, I Moore 120, 124; s.-c. 7 Taunt. 422,
426; or of Lord DENMAN in Keir v. Leeman, 6 Q. B. 808,-821.
But in the very able judgment of the Exchequer Chamber in
Keir v. Leeman, 9 Q. B. 371, Chief Justice TINDAL, after reviewing the previous cases, summed up the matter thus: "Indeed
it is very remarkable what very little authority there is to be
found, rather consisting of dicta than decisions, for the principle,
that any compromise of a misdemeanor, or indeed of any public
offence, can be otherwise than illegal, and any promise, founded
on such a consideration, otherwise than void. If the matter were
res integra, we should have no doubt on this point. We have no
doubt that, in all offences which involve damages to an injured
party for which he may maintain an action, it is competent for
him, notwithstanding they are also of a public nature, to compromise or settle his private damage in any way he may think fit. It
is said, indeed, that in the case of an assault he may also undertake not to prosecute on behalf of the public. It may be so, but
we are not disposed to extend this any further."
In Fisher v. Apollinaris Co., Law Rep. 10 Ch. 297, the plaintiff, pursuant to an agreement of the defendants to abandon a
prosecution against him under St. 25 & 26 Vict., c. 88, for a violation of their trade mark, gave them a letter of apology, with
authority to make such use of it as they might think necessary,
and, after they had published it by advertisement for two months,
filed a bill in equity to restrain them from continuing the publication, which was dismissed by the Lords Justices. The principal
grounds of the decision appear to have been that the defendants
had done nothing that the plaintiff had not authorized them to do;
and that, even if the publication affected the plaintiff's reputation,
a court of chancery had no jurisdiction to restrain it. See Prudential Assurance Co. v. Knott, Law Rep. 10 Ch. 142; Boston
Diatite Co. v. Florence Manufaturing Co., 114 Mass. 69. It
was indeed observed that "it was no more a violation of the law
to accept an apology in such a case than it would be to compromise an indictment for a nuisance or for not repairing a highway
on the terms of the defendants agreeing to remove the nuisance
or repair the highway :" Law Rep. 10 Ch. 302. But this obserELuLENOROUGIH
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vation was not necessary to the decision ; and in The Queen v.
Blakemore, 14 Q. B. 541, an agreement for the compromise or all
indictment for not repairing a highway was held illegal and void.
All the other recent English authorities support the judgment of
Chief Justice TINDAL, above quoted: The Queen. v. flardey, 14
Q. B. 529, 541 ; (Jlubb v. Hutson, 18 C. B. N. S. 414; Trilliams
v. Bayley, Law Rep. I H. L. 200, 213, 220.
In Jones v. Rice, 18 Pick. 440, 442, Mr. Justice PUTNAM,
delivering the opinion of this court, after alluding to the English
cases in the time of Lord KENYONT, relied on to "sustain the distinction between considerations arising from the compounding of
felonies, which is admitted to be illegal, and the compounding of
misdemeanors, which is alleged to be lawful," said: "We do not
think that such a power is vested in individuals. It would enable
them to use the claim of the government for their own emolument,
and greatly to the oppression of the people. It has a direct tendency to obstruct the course of the administration of justice; and
the mischief extends, we think, as well to misdemeanors as to felonies.
The power to stop prosecutions is vested in the law officers of the
Commonwealth, who use it with prudence and discretion. If it
were given to the party injured, who might be the only witness
who could prove the offence, he might extort, for his own use,
money which properly should be levied as a fine upon the criminal
party for the use of the Commonwealth."
It is true that the prosecution in Jones v. Rice was for a riot
as well as for an assault. But the language and the reasoning of
the opinion extend to the compounding of any offence whatever.
Any act which is made punishable by law as a crime is an offence
against the public, and, especially in this country, where all prosecutions are subject to the control of official prosecutors, and not
of the individuals immediately injured, cannot lawfully be made
the subject of private compromise, except so far as expressly authorized by statute. And this view is supported by the great
weight of American authority: Hinds v. Chamberlin, 6 N. II.
225 ; Shaw v. Spooner, 9 Id. 198 ; Shaw v. Reed, 30 Maine 105;
Bowen v. Buck, 28 Verm. 308; People v. Bishop, 6 Wend. 111;
lToble v. Peebles, 13 S.& R. 319, 322; lNaurer v. 11itehell, 9 W.
& S. 69, 71; Cameron v. 3icarland,2 Car. Law Rep. 415;
Corley v. Williams, 1 Bailey 588 ; VTincent v. Groom, 1 Yerger
430; 'Net. Con. 226, 227; 1 Story Eq. Jur., § 294.
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The legislature of the Commonwealth has defined the cases and
circumstances in which the compromise of a prosecution shall be
allowed. By a provision first introduced in the Revised Statutes,
when a person is committed or indicted for an assault and battery
or other misdemeanor for which the party injured may have a
remedy by civil action (except when committed by or upon an
officer of justice, or riotously, or with intent to commit a felony),
if the party injured appears before the magistrate or court and
acknowledges satisfaction for the injury sustained, a stay of proceedings may be ordered: Rev. Stats. c. 135, § 25; c. 136, § 27;
Gen. Stats. c. 170, § 33 ; c. 171, § 28. Such an acknowledgment
of satisfaction does not entitle the defendant to be discharged, but
leaves it to the discretion of the magistrate or court whether a stay
of proceedings is consistent with the interests of public justice :
Commonwealth v. -Dowdican'8 Bail, 115 Mass. 133. See also
State v. Hunter, 14 La. Ann. 71.
In the case at bar, it being found as a fact that the agreement
sued on was entered into by the defendant for the purpose of compounding a complaint against her son for a misdemeanor, and it not
appearing that satisfaction has ever been acknowledged in or
approved by the court in which the prosecution was pending, judgment was rightly ordered for the defendant.
Exceptions overruled.
That a contract to compound a felony
is illegal is elementary law on both
sides of the Atlantic. In addition to
the cases cited in the opinion see also
iRoll v. Pgituet, 4 Ohio 400; furph.y v.
Bottomer, 40 Mo. 67 ; Brown v. Padgett,
36 Gee. 609. And it is not necessary
to prove that in fact a felony has been
committed. If a charge of felony is
bon! fide made, and tbe accused agrees
to pay money to stifle investigation into
the truth of the charge, the contract is
as illegal as if the promisor were really
guilty : Chandler v. Johnson, 39 Geo.
85.

Such contracts are not only invalid at
law, but courts of equity have power to
order their surrender and cancellation :
Loonts v. Cline, 4 Barb. 453 ; Porter v.
Jones, 6 Coldw. 313 ; where the subject

is carefully considered. And not only
is a note given on such consideration
not binding on the maker, but the receiver also violates the law in accepting it. If, therefore, a person commits a larceny and subsequently gives
his note for the value of the goods
stolen, and the payee promises not to
expose or prosecute him, the latter is
thereby guilty of an indictable offence
at common law: Commonwealth v. Pease,
16 Mass. 91.
Such a transaction was called in the
early law "theft bote," and the party
agreeing not to prosecute such a felony
was considered an accessory after the
fact. Indeed, the ancient Salic law
"latroni eum sinilem habuit qui furtum
relare vellct, et occultb sine judice compositionem ejus admittere." The old
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rule of holding him an accessory to the
principal felony was, however, so far
afterwards modified as to render it a
substantive crime, and punishable without any prior conviction of the other
party (Pcople v. Buckland, 13 Wend.
592), which could not be done, as is well
known, at common law, so long as he
was a mere accessory. Such was the
familiar rule in all felonies. And, notwithstanding some intimations to the
contrary in England as to some classes
of misdemeanors, the same rule applies
In Americaj for reasons so well stated
by Chief Justice GRAY, in the principal case, to all offences of any
grade punishable by public prosecution. And the contract not to prosecute
need not be express; it may jbe implied.
A mutual "understanding"
to that
effect is as fatal as a direct promise.
See Clark v. .Pomeroy, 4 Allen 534;
Conderman v. )icks, 3 Lans. 108, although both these cases were decided
upon statutes. This implied understanding underlies the English statute
of 7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 29 (1827), reenacted in stat. 24 & 25 Vict., c. 95
(1861), making it a penal offence to
advertise for stolen property with an
assurance of "Cno questions asked."
A promise to make amends, however,
for property stolen or embezzled, though
grounded on an expectation merely that
no prosecution would be instituted, is
not invalid : Ward v. Lloyd, 6 Al. & G.
785 ; and see Ford v. Cratty, 52 Ill.
313. But wherever a promise not to
prosecute has been made, the note or
contract of the adverse party to pay for
the wrong done is not only invalid as an
executory contract,, but all mortgages
given to secure it are equally void, nnd
cannot be enforced either at law or
equity ; Den v. Moore, 2 South. 470;
Raguct v. Roll, 7 Ohio 77 ; Atwood v.
Fisk, 101 Mass. 363. But if money
or other property has been actually
paid or delivered on such an illegal
Vo. XXV.-35

contract, it cannot, for the lame
reason, be recovered back at law.
Courts will not help the parties, but
will leave them where it finds them :
Morcester v. Eaton, I1 Mass. 376 ; Dartmouth v. Bennett, 15 Barb. 541 ; Leonard
v. Travis, 6 Allen 130; Dixon v.
Olmstead, 9 Vt. 310. Especially where
the money paid is only-an actual equivalent for the payee's loss : lothwell v.
Brown, 51 I1. 234. And doubtless a
pledge of personal property made to
secure such promise of payment could
not be recovered back at law by the
pledgor any more than an actual payment : King v. Green, 6 Allen 139.
Not only are such contracts illegal
when made solely in consideration of a
promise not to prosecute, but if that be
any part of the consideration of a note,
the whole is void : Shaw v. Spooncr, 9
N. H. 197 ; Raguet v. Boll, 7 Ohio 77;
Bowen v. Buck, 28 Vt. 308 ; Badger v.
Willian, I Chip. 137.
The question often arises whether
such notes are valid in the hands of an
innocent endorsee.
On the one hand there is some room
for argument that such contracts are
wholly void on the ground of public
policy, and are not merely defective for
want of a legal consideration. And
the acknowledged principle that the
promisee of such a negotiable note, by
taking it for his own illegal promise
not to prosecute the maker, has himself
committed an illegal act, rendering him.
self liable to indictment and punishment, tends to support this view. These
considerations apparently led the court
of South Carolina to declare in Bell v.
Wood, 1 Bay 251 (1792), that such a
note was void by the common law.
"The circumstance of this note," say
they, " being in the hands of an endorsee ignorant of the original transaction, makes no kind of difference;
for being void, in its original creation,
for illegality and turpitude, it can never
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afterwards be valid so as to charge the
maker. Some notes are void by the
common law, others made so by statute ;
there is, however, no essential difference between them. They are in both
cases equally void, and without any
binding efficacy on the maker. If then
they are so, no good reason can be
assigned why the holder of a note,
made void by the common law, should
recover, any more than the endorsee
of a note made void by statute. In all
these cases the common law and statutes
use the same powerful language, to
wit, that " they never had a legal existence."

But, notwithstanding this express assertion, it must be admitted the case is
hardly an authority to the point, since
it there appeared that the note was
endorsed a year after it became due,
and was therefore open to the same
defence as if in the hands of the payee;
and besides, it seems to have been only
a jury trial.
On the other hand, the desire to protect commercial paper, and the idea
that the only defect in such a note is
the illegality of the consideration, viz.,
the promise to stifle the prosecution,
have led some courts to hold such notes
valid in the hands of an innocent endorsee for value before maturity : Clark
v. Ricker, 14 N. H. 44 ; Wentworth v.
Blaisdell, 17 N. H. 275 ; Hill v.
X\orthup, 4 N. Y. (Superior Court) 120.
Similar decisions have been elsewhere
made on notes which were contrary to

public policy, such as to pay for improper influence on legislative proceedings : ilfeadeo v. Bird, 22 Geo. 246 :
Thwrne v. 1'ontz, 4 Cal. 321 ; or to aid
the rebellion : Hatch v. Burroughs, I
Woods 448 ; or for gaming, when the
statute does not make the contract absolutely void : Haight v. Joyce, 2 Cal. 64.
See other instances in Bobinson v. Crenshaw, 2 Stew. & Port. 276 ; Grimes v.
17ilderbrand,6 N. Y. (Superior Ct.) 620.
The familiar rule being that ifa note is
expressly made null and void by a statute, it is so even in the hands of an innocent endorsee: Lowe v. Waller, 2 Doug.
736; Unger v. Boas, 11 Penna. St.
601; Kendall v. Robertson, 12 Cash.
156; but if the statute only makes the
consideration illegal, the note is good in
the hands of a bon& fide holder. And
strong words are necessary to have the
effect to deprive the latter of a remedy
against the maker. Thus, if a statute
against liquor-selling declares that 'all
payments or compensations for liquors
sold in violation of law should be held
and considered to have been in violation
of law, without consideration, and
against law, equity and good conscience," a note given in payment
for such liquors is not thereby invalid
in the hands of a bon, fide endorsee
before maturity, without notice of such
illegality: Cazet v. Feld, 9 Gray 329.
The simple word "void" w.ould have
had far more effect than all this periphrase.
EDMUND H. BENTT.

Superior Court of JNew Hamp8ltre.
GERRISH v. GLINES.
Where a negotiable promissory note was made payable upon a condition, and
the condition was written below the note on the same piece of paper, Held, that
the note and condition were parts of a single entire contract, and that the fraudulent removal of the condition, by tearing the paper, was such a material alteration as rendered the note void in the hands of a bon& fide holder.
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ASSUMPSIT, to recover the amount of two promissory notes,
each dated-July 15th 1872, and payable to 0. J. Stickles & Co.,
or bearer, one for $66.74, six months from date with use, and the
other for $250, one year from date with use, and each signed by
the defendant. The action was sent to a referee by order of court,
who at this term makes report that he finds due from the defendant to the plaintiff the amount confessed, and no more; and he
reports his conclusions of fact and law as follows: "The plaintiff's
writ is dated March 11th 1874, with general count, and the two
notes above described were specified as plaintiff's claim, sought to
be recovered in this suit. The defendant confesses the first note
for $66.74; and as to the second note described for $250, says
he never promised, &c. Reference to the writ, specification, plea
and confession on file may be had. The plaintiff read said notes
*and put them in as evidence, and rested his case. On the back
of said note for $66.74, is written and crossed as.follows

"Demand notice waived.
" LEONARD GERRISH."

The other note for $250 was written on the back, "Demand
notice waived. LEONARD GERRISH." The defendant offered to
prove, did prove, and I find that when said defendant made and
signed said note of $250, there was written on the same paper
with said note, and un ler the defendant's signature to said note,
and signed by said defendant and the payee of said note, the
following, to wit, "Condition. This note is given on the following
conditions: W. F. Glines, of the first part, agrees to work his
territory faithfully and well; and 0. J. Stickles & Co., of the
second part, agree if W. F. Glines, of the first part, does not
make one thousand dollars over and above what he pays for said
territory, then the above note is void and of no effect. [Signed]
0. J. STICKLES & Co., W. F. GLINES."
The plaintiff's counsel objected to the evidence of this condition,
without showing first that the plaintiff had knowledge of it at the
time he ,took or purchased said note. The evidence was ruled in,
notwithstanding the objection, and the plaintiff took exceptions to
said ruling. It appeared, from cross-examination of the defendant, that he did not "work all his territory faithfully and well,"
according to said condition, and from the plaintiff's testimony!
without exception, that when he purchased said note, no such con-

GERRISH v. GLINES.

dition was annexed to said note, and that he had no knowledge of
this condition or agreement at that time, and that he paid a fair
and full consideration for said note.
I find that said condition had been torn off, and before the
plaintiff purchased said note. And I rule, under the foregoing
facts, that such alteration avoided the note in the hands of an
innocent endorsee, and that the plaintiff cannot recover said note
in this suit under any view.
The questions of law thus raised were transferred to this court
for determination by FoSTER, C. J.

Barnard,for the plaintiff.
Pike & Blodgett, for the defendant.
LADD, J.-Upon the facts found by the referee in this case, I

am of opinion that his conclusions of law were correct, and that
there should be judgment on the report accordingly. It is claimed
by the plaintiff, in effect, that the note, and the condition written
below it on the same piece of paper, are to be regarded as evidence of two distinct contracts, and treated as two separate instruments. I think that view cannot be sustained. The memorandum is entitled "Condition," and its first words are, " This
note is given on the following conditions," &c. It seems to me
beyond all question, that the condition is one part of a single
entire contract, of which the note is the other; that the' whole
paper together must be treated as a single instrument, and that
any division of it, whereby a negotiable promissory note, which
had no legal existence before, was created, was such a material
alteration as rendered the whole void; that it was, in fact, no
less than a forgery, which would render the note thus brought
into existence altogether void, even in the hands of a bong fide
holder who paid a full consideration for it before maturity. The
authorities, in this state and elsewhere, establishing the rule as to
the effect of a fraudulent and material alteration or forgery of a
negotiable promissory note, are too numerous and too familiar to
require citation. My conclusion is, that the plaintiff cannot
recover the 8250 note, for both the reasons given by the referee.
CusnING, 0. J.-The note for $250, when issued by the defendant, was qualified by a condition annexed to it, and referring
to it in such mode as to show that it was intended to remain
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attached to it so long as it was in force, and probably until it was
detached by consent of the defendant. The payment of the note
was then dependant upon a contingency, and therefore the note
was not negotiable: Fletcher v. Blodgett, 16 Verm. 26; Fletcher
v. Thompson, 55 N. II. 408, and cases there cited.
Independently, therefore, of the effect produced upon the note
by a material alteration, it is enough for this case that the action
cannot be maintained in the name of this plaintiff. When the
note was issued by the defendant it was not negotiable, and could
not be made so without his consent. It appears to have been
altered by tearing off the condition after it came into the possession of the original payee. It is not, therefore, the note which the
defendant gave. He has a right to say non in luecfoedere veni-I
did not make this bargain. It is plain enough, in reason as well as
iii authority, that the endorsee in this case is in no better condition
than the original payee. The maker of a negotiable note is bound
by that note as he makes it, and against an innocent endorsee his
defences are much restricted ; but it is only the note which he actually made, and not a different note, which binds hi h* in this way.
The case of Johnson v. Heagan, 24 Me. 329, is an authority to
show that the removal of the written condition was a material
alteration. It is not necessary, perhaps, to consider any further
the effect of this alteration in avoiding the note. The cases of Master v. _iller, 4 Term 32 ; 2 H. B1. 141 ; Davidson v. Cooper, 11
M. & W. 778; 18 Id. 343; Powell v. Divitt, 15 East 29, seem to
show conclusively that the effect of such an alteration, made after
the acceptance of the bill or giving the note, would not only be to
avoid the note in the hands of an innocent endorsee, but also,
if fraudulently done, to discharge the debt: Gibbs v. Linabur/,
22 Mich. 479; Benedict v. Cowden, 49 N. Y. 396.
SMITH, J.-The principle, that the fraudulent removal of a
memorandum originally attached to a note and qualifying the contract, constitutes a material alteration and destroys the note, is
well established: Benedict v. Cowden, 49 N. Y. 376, and authorities there cited. The plaintiff is entitled to recover the amount
confessed, and costs to the date of the confession, and the defendant is entitled to recover costs since that time.
Judgment accordingly.
The American cases on this head are
all of recent date, and greatly re-

semble each other in the facts. A
farmer is tempted by an offer appar-
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ently advantageous to sign a conditional
promissory note, or an instrument convertible into a promissory note. The
condition is then torn off or the instrument altered, and sold to a bonut
fide buyer. The cases may be thus
divided :I. Where no negligence is alleged in
the signer of the instrument. Here
the current of authority is that as the
party did not intend to create a negotiable security, and the note sued
upon is not the instrument given by
him, there can be no recovery upon it ;
the condition being inseparable from
the promise. In Mfastcr v. Miller, 4
T. R. :320, and the note thereto in
Smith's Leading Cases, vol. i., pp.
1254, 1281, will he found the strongest
statement of this doctrine. A material
alteration of a promissory note made
by the creditor after execution, and increasing or injuriously affecting the responsibility of the debtor, will avoid
the note even in the hands of a bonh
fide holder, and although the alteration
was such as to defy the closest scrutiny.
The cases cited in Gerrishv. Glines are
here in point; but it is remarkable that
the onestion of negligence was raised
in none of them. In Johnson v. IIegan
and Fetcher v. Blodgett, the plaintiff
was present at the signing of the note.
In Gibbs v. Linabay and Benedict v.
Seaton, the carelessness of the defendant was apparently never adverted to ;
and in the latter case ALLEN, J., delivering the opinion of the Court of
Appeals, said : "The question whether
the defendant by his act, negligent or
otherwise, enabled the payee to commit
a forgery and perpetrate a fraud on an
innocent purchaser of the note, and, if
so, as to the effect of such negligence
or any want of proper care upon his
liability on the note as altered by the
severance of the memorandum, was not
raised upon the trial, and cannot, therefore, now be made on this appeal."
II. But where on the pleadings or by

the evidence the defendant's negligence
sufficiently appears, it is fof the court'to
sustain a demurrer to the plea or to
give the jury binding directions. Thus,
in Douglass v..Matting, 29 Iowa 498,
where the defendant pleaded that he
signed the instrument sued on believing
it to be a duplicate contract of agency,
not, however, alleging that he had read
the contents, or that the note had been
altered after signature, the demurrer
was sustained by the Supreme Court,
who held that the defence was insufficient, and the defendant had been defrauded "through his own gross negligence." That the burden is upon the
defendant to show reasonable prudence
is decided also in Chapmar v. Ross, 56
New York 137, where a promissory
note was signed as a duplicate contract
of agency. The court below instructed
the jury that if the paper sued on
was never delivered as a note, the
plaintiff must fail. This was held to
be error, because it did not also appear
that the defendant was guilty of no negligence. "It is necessary," said JoiNsON, J., "to hold firmly to the doctrine that he who, by his carelessness or
undue confidence, has enabled another
to obtain the money of an innocent person, shall answer the loss." So in
Taylor v. Atchison, 54 Ill.196, where
the ease was tried by the court, and ini
Nebeker v. Cutsinger, 48 Ind. 436, the
negligence or diligence of the defendant
was regarded as a question of law, the
facts being undisputed. In the former,
where the decision was put upon a local
act, the defendant, who could read with
some difficulty, signed the paper handed
to him without reading it. It was held
that he was not negligent in so doing :
but that the plaintiff was in fault in
taking the note from a patent-right
agent, with whom he had no previous
acquaintance. In Nebeker Y. Cutsinger,
the jury found a verdict for the defendant ; but on special interrogatories they
answered on the evidence that he could
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read, and if he had read the paper
offered for his signature, would have
discovered the fraud. It was held that
the court below should have given judgment for the plaintiff on the answers to
the interrogatories. See also Nebek-er
v. Cochran, 14 Am. Law Reg. N. S.
697. In Shirts v. Overjohn, 60 Mo.
305, it was laid down (overruling
B~riggs v. Ewart, 51 Mo. 245 ; Marlin
v. Smylee, 55 Id. 577, and Corby v.
Weddle, ,57 Id. 452, so far as they
are in variance) that when it appears
that the party sought to be charged
intended to bind himself by some obligation in writing, and signed his name,
having full means of ascertaining for
himself the true character of such instrument before signing it, but neglecting to avail himself of such means, and
relying on the representations of another, signed and delivered a negotiable
promissory note, he cannot be heard to
impeach its validity in the hands of a
bon, fide holder. In Putnam v. Sullivan, 4 ass. 45, a distinction was set
up arguendo between endorsing a note
through fraudulent misrepresentation,
and endorsing a different paper from
that which the party intended to sign ;
but it was held, that, whatever there
might be in the distinction, an endorser
"cannot
avail himself of it but in
cases where he is not chargeable with
any laches or neglect, or misplaced confidence in others."
The Engl.:h authorities are to the
same effect. Young v. Grote, 4 Bing.
420, may be considered as the leading
case. A check was filled in by an
agent in such a way as to admit of the
amount being increased without exciting suspicion. It was held that the
loss must fall upon the customer, as
the bank had been misled through his
negligence. BEST, J., quoted the general rule from Pothier that that one of
two innocent persons shall suffer whose
act occasioned the loss. Swan v. North
British Australasian Co., 2 H. & C. 184,
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virtually lays down the same rule, with
the qualification that the negligence
must be of some duty cast upon the
party by law, and must be the proximate cause of the loss. In that case
the plaintiff, who was a registered
shareholder in the defendant company,
signed and gave to his broker blank
forms of transfer to be used in selling
shares in another company. The broker
pot only filled in the forms fraudulently,
hut forged the attestations and stole the
certificates from a locked box; held,
that Swan had committed no such negligence as to estop him from bringing
suit. The essential distinction comes
out even more strongly by a comparison
of Ingham v. Primrose, 7 C. B. N. S.
82, with Schole.j v. Ramsbottom, 2 Camp.
485. In both cases negotiable securities
were torn up by the maker, and afterwards picked up, pasted together, and
fraudulently put into circulation. In
the former ease, however, it was held
that the bon& fide holder could recover,
as there was nothing in the appearance
of the bill to make a man of ordinary
intelligence suspicious. Even if putting the halves together were a forgery,
yet defendant by his conduct lad led to
plaintiff's becoming owner for value.
But in Scholey v. Pamsbottom, where the
rents were visible and the face of the
cheek soiled and dirty, the holder was
not allowed to recover. The question,
therefore, is one of negligence, and of
good faith as affected by negligence.
In .Fosterv. Jfackinnon,L. R. 4 C. P. 704
(1869), where the defendant endorsed a
bill of exchange believing it to be a
guarantee, the jury were directed that
if defendant believed, &c., "and if he
was not guilty of any negligence in so
signing," he was entitled to a verdict.
This was held a proper direction ; but
the jury having found for defendant, a
new trial was granted because the verdict was against the weight of evidence
on the question of negligence.
It follows that instructions which call
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the attention of the jury from the question of negligence are misleading. In
Phelan v. Moss, 67 Penna. St. 59, below
the contract of agency was written a
promissorynote; and in inmunermann v.
Rote, 75 Penn. St. 188, a condition was
written on the side of the note. * In
both cases the court below, who decided
that the alteration in the note sued on
amounted to a forgery, and directed the
mind of the jury to the evidence on that
head, were overruled and the negligence
of the defendant and good faith of the
plaintiff held to be the points at issue.
See also Garrardv. Haddan, 67 Penna.
St. 82.
If in the pleadings. however, circumstances of imposition are alleged which
tend to exonerate the party from the
charge of negligence, the court will not
sustain a demurrer, as the question is
one of evidence for the jury. Thus in
Cline v. Guthrie, 42 Ind. 227, the defendant pleaded that he signed his name
on a piece of paper to show the agents
for a hayfork how it was spelt; that
they wrote a promissory note over it,
and when he picked the paper up and
asked what that meant, they snatched it
from him and drove away. -A demurrer
to this plea was sustained by the court
below, but overruled by the Supreme
Court, who placed their decision on the
ground that the note was never made
or delivered, and drew the distinction
between cases where the maker "has
actually and voluntarily parted with
the possession of the note, and where
he has not." See to the .same effect
Burson v. Huntington, 21 Mich. 415.
This distinction appears to be chiefly
important as bearing upon the question.
of negligence. In Walker v. Ebert, 29
Wis. 194, the defendant, a German,
could not read or write English. Evidence that he signed the note sued on
believing it to be a contract of agency,
and that the note was never delivered,
was rejected by the lower court; held
to be error, and new trial awarded.

The decision is carefully put upon the
ground that the evidence tended to disprove negligence, and is distinguished
from Douglass v. Matting, supra, on
that score by DixoN, C. J.; though It
may be doubted irhether the signing of
an instrument drawn up by a stranger
in an unknown language is not in Itself
gross carelessness. In Brown v. Reed,
79 Penna. St. 370, the defendant offered
to swear that he signed a paper which
on its face was a contract of agency, so
arranged that if a portion on the right
side were cut off, there would remain a
promissory note. Held to be error, as
the question of negligence was for the
jury, and depended on whether the line
of demarcation between the parts of the
instrument was distinct and conspicuous:
per SnaxswooD, J.
Whitney v. Snyder, 2 Lansing 477,
is a case difficult to reconcile with the
current of authority. The defendant
offered to prove that he signed the
note sued upon believing it was a contract of agency. The rejection of
this offer by the lower court was held
error. "There are and must be some
defences," says TAIOTT, J., "as to
which even a bon& fide purchaser purchases at his peril ;1" and the question
was whether the party "intended to
sign and put in circulation the note
as a negotiable security." The only
reference to the question of negligence
was, apparently, in the opinion of the
court, the judge remarking that this was
a stronger case in this respect for the
defendant than Foster v. Mackinnon,
supra, which has been relied on as
authority.
It is submitted finally that the various
distinctions laid down in regard to the
cases where one or two persons innocent
of intentional wrong must suffer, come
down to a question of negligence in
him whose act made the loss possible.
If he has neglected a duty imposed on
him by law, if he has not exercised
ordinary diligence, the loss should fall
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on him. Whenever the decision has
been put on other grounds, such as that
the defendant never made or delivered
the instrument, that he never voluntarily parted with it, that his mind did
not go with the deed, that the paper
amounted to a forgery, &c., it will be
found that these facts either tended to
show the absence of negligence, or were
essential because issue had not been
made on such negligence. Thus in
Burson v. Huntington, Walker v. Ebert,
Cline v. Guthrie, Brown v. Reed, supra,
the offer of the defendant was in effect
to show that he had been reasonably

diligent. Forgery and theft are probably extreme cases; yet it has been repeatedly laid down that a negotiable
instrument stolen and put in circulation
can be recovered on ; and in Inyham v.
Primrose, supra, the court intimate that
a forgery which the defendant by his
negligence had made possible would not
be a ground of defence against a bonil
fide holder. In Chapman v. Rose, supra,
the question was fully and carefully decided in a manner which appears to
satisfy common sense and reasonably
protect the holders of negotiable securities.
R. S. HUNTER.

Supreme Court of the United States.
WASHINGTON COCKLE

XT AL. v.

JAMES W. FLACK

ET AL.

Where a commission merchant in Baltimore advanced to a pork packer in
Peoria $100,000, for which he was to receive interest at the rate of 10 per cent.
per annum, and a fixed commission for the sale of the product, to be paid whether
it was sold by the commission merchant or not, it was properly left to the jury to
decide on all the facts whether or not the commissions were a cover for usury, or
were an honest contract for commission business in connection with the use of
money.
The express agreement of 10 per cent. is not usurious, because lawful in Illinois
though not so in Maryland : Andrews v. Pond, 13 Pet. 65, re-affirmed.

IN error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the
Northern District of Illinois.
The opinion of the court was delivered lby
MILLER, J.-Plaintiffs in error were engaged in the business of

packing pork in Peoria, Illinois, and the defendants were commission merchants in Baltimore, in the fall of 1872, when the contract was made which is the foundation of this suit. There had
been transactions between the parties the previous year in the line
of their business, and with reference to the packing business of
the approaching season. This agreement was made by letter. The
substance of it is that defendants should advance to plaintiffs as
it was needed, the sum of $100,000, which they were to invest in
the hog product, at the rate of 80 per cent. of the money so advanced, and 20 per cent. of the money put in to the purchase by
plaintiffs. Defendants were to have interest on the money
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advanced at the rate of 10 per cent. per annum. The product
was to be shipped to them for sale, and they were to have 2J per
cent. commission on the amount if sold within sixty days, and 1
per cent. commission for every thirty days it was carried thereafter. The contract gave to plaintiffs the right to sell for them,
selves without sending to defendants, but the latter were to have
their commissions all the same.
When the product had all been sold out and an account rendered,
a balance was found to be due defendants in error, for which they
brought this suit, and recovered a judgment of $7054.48.
It appears by the bill of exceptions that this balance was mainly
if not wholly made up of the commissions charged on sales not
made by defendants of products which never came to their possession, and the recovery was resisted on the sole ground that these
commissions were a device to cover usurious interest.
The charge of the court to the jury on this point was to the
effect that the transaction was not necessarily usurious ; that defendants being engaged in the commission business, which required
the use of money, might loan their money at lawful rates of interest to such parties, and on such terms that it would bring to
them also the business which would grow out of the investment
of it, that if the contract was made only with the honest purpose
of securing in addition to interest, the profits incidental to handling the product as commission merchants, it was not usurious;
that on the other hand such a contract might be used as a mere
evasive device to cover usurious interest, and the charge left it to
the jury to say from all the circumstances whether this were so.
There can be no question that on the general doctrine as to the
line which marks the division between an honest transaction and a
usurious cover, the charge of the court was correct, and that it is
in this class of cases the province of the jury in jury trials, and
of the chancellor in suits in equity to determine on a full consideration of all the facts whether it be the one or the other.
But counsel for plaintiffs in error argue that as to these commissions which defendants never earned by sale of the property or by
handling it, and as to which they were put to no cost or inconvenience, there can be no other consideration but the use of the
money, and they are necessarily usurious.
It must be confessed that the argument has much force. But
we are of opinion that it is not so conclusive that the court ought
to have held as matter of law that it was usury.
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It is to be considered that defendants were engaged in a business which was legitimate, and in which both custom and sound
principle authorized the joint use of their money and their personal
,service, increased in value by their character for integrity and experience. To both these sources they looked for their profits, and
they were necessarily united.
It was a necessity of their trade, and it was lawful for them
while loaning their money at a specified rate of interest to stipulate with the parties to whom it was loaned for the incidental
advantages of acting as commission merchants for the sale of the
property in which the money was to be invested by the borrower.
They had the right also to require as a condition of the loan that
it should be invested in such property as would require their services in selling and handling it. All this is admitted.
We see no reason why the parties could not go a step further,
and stipulate that if for any reason operating in the interest of
the borrower, he should prefer to become his own broker or commission merchant, or to sell at home, he should pay the commission which the other had a right to contract for and receive. Like
the port pilot, and other instances, they were ready and willing to
perform. They had a place of business, clerks, and their own
time and skill ready to devote to the plaintiffs' business. In that
business they had a large pecuniary interest. They had loaned
their money without requiring any other security than the obligation of the other party, except that which might arise from the
property coming to their hands. To make this property a sufficient security the contract required of the plaintiffs that they
should invest in the same property $20 of their own money to every
$80 borrowed of defendants. The relinquishment of this right
to control the sale of the property was a good consideration for
the commissions which they would have made if they had sold it.
While it was possible to make such a transaction a mere cover
for usury, it was at the same time possible that the contract was
a fair one, in aid of defendants' business, a business in which they
were actually and largely engaged, and in which lending money
was the mere incident and not the main pursuit.
It was, therefore, properly left to the jury to say whether, under
all the circumstances it was or was not a usurious transaction,
under instruction to which we can see no objection.
We do not think the express reservation of 10 per cent. interest
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makes the contract usurious, because the law of Maryland forbids
more than six. The contract was quite as much an Illinois contract where 10 per cent. is lawful as a Maryland contract, and the
former is the law of the forum. The ruling of the court below
was in accord with what this court had held in Andrews v. Pond,
13 Pet. 65.
The judgment of the Circuit Court is affirmed.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.
IARY S. STEVENS v. E. & N. A. RAILWAY.
Although the burden of proof falls upon a plaintiff to establish the negligence
of a railroad company sued for an injury caused by their cars running off the
track ; still, where the plaintiff is guilty of no negligence, and ,the cause of the
accident is not disclosed by the attending circumstances, the burden of explanation falls upon the company to show that there was no fault upon their part ; and
a jury would be authorized to presume them guilty of negligence if they fail to do
so.
CASE brought to recover damages for personal injuries received
on the defendants' railway, August 28th 1873.
It appeared in evidence that the plaintiff was a passenger on the
car of the defendant company, getting on at Bangor; that the car,
being about three-fourths full, proceeded about twenty-five rods
from the depot at a rate of speed from five to ten, miles an hour,
and then went off the track, producing a slight shock. It did not
appear that the car was damaged, or that any of the passengers,
except this plaintiff, received any injury. The passengers left- the
car, the plaintiff, among others; and she walked to her house some
four-fifths of a mile.
She testided that she was fifty-four years of age and in good
health when she entered the car; that the train commenced slatting soon after the cars started, slat her from right to left, then
stopped, jerked back, and then pitched forward ; that her back was
thrown against the back of her seat; that she was also pitched on
to the back of the seat in front; that she at first fainted, and then
recovered somewhat and was assisted out of the car; that by
resting frequently on the way and receiving some support, she
succeeded in reaching her home, took her lounge, had severe pain
in the back, hip and head; sent for the doctor, took and kept her
bed entirely for five days; that she got up very poorly; found she
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had received severe internal injuries from which she had not
recovered.
She introduced no evidence to show negligence on the part of
the company.
On the part of the defence, evidence was introduced tending to
show that the car was comparatively new, the wheels and axle had
been little used, were purchased of a company having a high reputation, were constructed of the best known materials, and combining all the appliances which men skilled in the art of car construction employ; that the car and wheels and axle were duly and
carefully inspected the night before and the morning when the
train started; that the cause of the running of the car from the
track was the loosening of the wheel; that this could not have
been detected by the most careful examination; that the loosening
of the wheel may take place when the wheel and axle have been
manufactured with the highest degree of skill and of the best
materials, and cannot be detected by the most careful inspection;
cannot be detected either by the ear or eye; that it may be a
latent defect not discoverable by the most careful examination and
not possibly to be prevented by the highest skill in manufacturing.
There was evidence that, before the suit was brought, the defendants paid the plaintiff $275, and employed and paid a physician to attend her $250.
The verdict was for the plaintiff; $1625, which the defendants
moved to have set asido as against law, evidence, its weight, and
on the ground of excessive damages.
. P. Stetson, for the defendants.
A. Sanborn, for the plaintiff.

PETERS, J.-The defendants move to have the verdict set aside.
There is a single ground upon which the verdict may stand. The
accident occurred within a moment after the cars left the depot in
Bangor, destined for St. John. It happened by a wheel being
loose upon the axle under one of the cars, the train being thrown
from the track thereby. The questions at the trial were: first,
whether the defect existed at the moment of starting, or whether
it might have been produced while the cars were running afterwards; and if it existed before starting, whether it could have
been discovered by the employees of the defendants by the use of
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proper and sufficient care. The latter question was a close on&.
The burden of explanation, however, that falls upon a company in
a case like this helps the plaintiff upon this point. Undoubtedly
the general burden of proof is upon the plaintiff to show that her
injury was caused by the negligence of the defendants. She avers
it and must prove it. Nor, in a strict sense, does the burden of
proof change: Small v. Clewley, 62 Me. 155. But it may be
aided and sustained by a presumption that arises upon the facts.
Where a passenger is in the use of proper care when an injury
happens to him by the cars running off the track, the cause of the
accident not appearing from the attending circumstances, it has
been frequently decided that negligence upon the part of the railroad company may be presumed against them, unless the imputation is removed by some satisfactory explanation upon their part.
As the cars and the track are within the exclusive possession and
control of the company, it is incumbent upon them to explain the
cause of an accident, it not being ordinarily in the power of the
passenger to do so. Cars can ordinarily be run with safety, and
when they are not, that fact itself is evidence of fault or defect
somewhere requiring explanation. The maxim, res ipea loquitur,
applies in such a case: Feital v. Middlesex Rai7road Co., 109
Mass. 398, and cases there cited; Stokes v. Saltontall, 13 Pet.
181; Railroad Co. v. Pollard,22 Wallace 341.
The question then comes, whether the explanation set up in
this case is made out . If the defect existed at the depot before
the train was put in motion, of which we think there was quite
satisfactory evidence, were the jury justified in belihving that it
could have been there remedied by such caution and watchfulness
on the part of the agents of the defendants as under the circumstances were required by common care ? We are not convinced
that the jury committed an error in this respect, giving the defendants the benefit of the interpretation of the rule as to common
care, invoked by them and supported by the authorities by them
cited. The defendant's witnesses do not swear positively that it
was not within the limits of practicability to have discovered the
defect before leaving the depot, if it existed then. The judgments
of the experts are based upon the statement that a proper and sufficient examination had been made by the employees, the correctness of which statement may well be doubted. If there are no
means of discovering such a defect, it is, certainly, a deplorable
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risk for travellers. The truth is, that men who have routine work
to perform often become careless. Undoubtedly defects may exist
in the running-gear of railroads, not discoverable by any of the
ordii*ya." tests applied for their detection; but we are not satisfied
that the jury erred in coming to the conclusion that such was not
the case here.
Upon the question of the amount of damages, we are by no
means free of doubt, whether the verdict should be sustained.
There is much reason to believe that the injury may be grossly
exaggerated, and there is some question whether the plaintiff had
previous good health enough to warrant her travelling upon the
road. But as the testimony is very conflicting, as bearing upon
this branch of the issues tried, we are disposed to allow the verdict
Motion overruled.
t6 stand.
APPLETON, C. J., DICKERSON, DANFORTII, VIRGIN and LIBBEY,

JJ., concurred.
Court of ariancery of New Jersey, February Term 1877.
MARIA IIULOCK v. WILLIAM 0. MULOCK.
In equity practice where the evidence has been closed it will not ordinarily be
opened for newly-discovered testimony merely cumulative, but this rule is not imperative ; it will be enforced subject to the discretion of the court.
Where the newly-discovered testimony is cumulative in character, but makes
plain and certain what was doubtful before, so that the court can see that it may
be material to a just decision of the cause and there has been no laches in the
party offering it, it will be admitted.
Evidence is not to be deemed cumulative which is different in kind and character
from what went before, such as admissions as distinguished from adverse testimony.
BILL for relief.
after publication.

Motion to admit newly-discovered evidence

John Whitehead and

. B.

aarna8, of. N. Y., for the motion.

T. N'. 2HcCarter,contri.
RuNYoN, Chancellor.-This suit is brought to set aside, on the
ground of fraud, two deeds of gift made by the complainant in
favor of the defendant (who is her son), purporting to convey to
him valuable real estate. The complainant alleges that the deeds
were obtained from her by the defendant through deception, which
he was enabled to practice upon her by reason of the confidential
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relations existing between them at the time. She is and then was
a widow, and very old, and he was intrusted by her as her agent
with the care of the property described in the deeds. The cause
was referred to the vice-chancellor, and the evidence was closed
on the 5th of April 1876. On the 14th of September following,
the deferidant applied for ]cave to examine three newly-discovered
witnesses, whose testimony he alleges is material to the issue in the
cause, and was not known to him until after the testimony was
closed and very shortly before the application was made. The
argument of the cause has not yet taken place; the testimony is
of admissions alleged to have been made by the complainant about
four years ago, and before the commencement of this suit, that she
had conveyed her property to the defendant. The complainant's
counsel insists that the established practice of the court forbids the
admission of the testimony because the evidence in the cause is
closed, and also because the testimony is merely cumulative. Its
materiality to the issue cannot be doubted. It goes to the merits.
The defendant has been guilty of no negligence in making his
application. The existence of the evidence was first known to
him after the testimony in the cause was closed, and no laches are
imputable to him for not having discovered the evidence before the
proofs in the cause closed. It is manifest that justice demands
that, under the circumstances of the case, the defendant should be
permitted to introduce the evidence unless it is merely cumulative
or corroborative of what has riot only been proved, but so proved
as not to be unavailable to him by reason of want of positiveness,
certainty or strength in the proof. It is urged, however, that to
admit the testimony at this stage of the cause would be an innovation upon the long-established practice of the court, which, it is
insisted, will not allow the introduction of new testimony as to the
matters in issue after publication passed, except to prove an
exhibit or the like. If, in order to reach a conclusion cons6nant
with justice on this application, it were necessary to abandon the
beaten path for the occasion, it would be done.
Precedents, however wise in their origin, and though hoary with
antiquity, are not to be followed when they hinder justice. There
would indeed be most notable incongruity in the refusal of this
court to admit newly-discovered evidence merely on the ground
that the testimony in the cause has been closed, when a court of
law would, under the like circumstances, admit it. Especially will
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the absurdity appear when it is considered that this court will grant'
relief against judgments at law on the ground that a fact material
to tile merits has been discovered since the trial (but too late to be
available at law) which could not by ordinary diligence have been
ascertained before. But no innovation is necessary in order to
admit the testimony now offered; if it is of such a character that
in justice it ought to be admitted, that end may be attained per
vias antiquas. There is no rule forbidding absolutely and under
all circumstances the introduction of new evidence on a rehearing.
Such indeed is the general rule, but it has exceptions: Gresley's
Eq. Ev. 198, 199; Seaton on Dec. 3. The practice is thus stated
in Harrison's Chancery Practice (1767), p. 46: "Though the
general rule be that after publication no new witness can be
examined, nor a witness before examined, yet upon special
circumstances set forth by affidavit the rule may be dispensed with,
nor are the exceptions limited to the proving and admission of
exhibits or even documentary evidence generally." In Newland v.
H0orsman, 2 Chan. Cas. 75 (1681), a new commission to examine
witnesses as to new matters arising on the hearing was granted.
In Yeedham v. Smith, 2 Vernon 463 (1704), it was said that if
after hearing a witness is convicted of perjury, advantage may be
taken of the fact on a rehearing. In the case of The Hlfayor and
Aldermen of London v. The _Earl of .Dorset, 1 Chan. Cas. 228,
upon a commission of charitable uses, the question on appeal was
whether certain houses were part of Bridewell belonging to the
city for the relief of the poor, or a part of Dorset House, which
point was referred to law to be tried and then to report; motion
was made for a commission to examine an aged witness who was
not discovered until that time, and who was unable to travel. It
was said that if she were able to travel she would be examined
at the trial, and it was urged that, though publication on hearing
was passed, yet the question being a freehold, and not properly
triable at law, it was reasonable that the testimony, the loss of
which might occasion the loss of the land, should be preserved.
The motion was opposed because publication had passed. The
Lord-Keeper remarking that the rule against examining after publication had been strict, said the court was the judge, and ordered
the commission and examination.
Says GILBERT (For. Rem. 180): "Upon a rehearing any exhibit may be proved viva voce as upon the original hearing, but no
VOL. XXV.-37

MUIOCK

L-.

.MULOCK.

proof can be offered of any new matter without special leave of
the court, which is seldom granted."

Said Lord ELDON, in Willan

v. Iillan, 19 Yes. 590, 592: "It is perfectly established that
after publication, previous to a,decree, and depositions have been
seen, you cannot examine witnesses farther without leave of the
court, which is not obtained without great difficulty, and the examination is generally confined to some particular facts." In
Gregory v. Marychurch, 12 ]Beav. 275, the plaintiff after publication discovered material evidence, "an admission by affidavit," and
leave was given on motion to introduce it and examine witnesses
accordingly, not only with leave to the defendants to cross-examine,
but with suggestions as to the mode in which they might introduce
counter testimony. In Prevost v. Gratz, 1 Peters C. C. 364, 379,
application for rehearing was made on the ground of newly-discovered evidence not documentary. Judge WASHINGTON, expressing
the strongest disposition to grant the motion because he was satisfied
.that the justice of the case would be promoted by so doing, nevertheless denied it, but the denial was put on the ground of laches.
Again, a bill of review may be filed, with consent of the court,
upon newly-discovered testimony in reference to the matters in
issue in the cause, not merely documentary evidence only, but
other evidence also: Cooper's Eq. 91; Hubbs v. Livingston, 3
Johns. Ch. 124; Story's Eq. Pl., sects. 412, 413.
It is true that in Brumagim v. Chew, 4 C. E. Green 837, Chancellor ZABRISKIE said that on a rehearing only such evidence as
was or could have been read on the hearing could be heard, but
this was evidently intended as an enunciation of the general rule.
The application in that case was to admit new evidence as to what
was, in fact, the law of .New York as to the effect of judgments
of the courts of that state, to show that the law was different from
what appeared on the hearing.
Judge STORY indeed, in Wood v. Mann, 2 Sumn. 316, where
testimony similar to that now under consideration was offered under
like circumstances and rejected, expressed an opinion that after
publication it would be better to exclude all testimony of newlydiscovered witnesses to any facts in issue unless connected with
some newly-discovered documents, but at the same time he recognised the fact that suet is not the rule. He carefully states the
facts as follows: "There is no universal and absolute rule which
prohibits the courts from allowing the introduction of newly-
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discovered evidence of witnesses to facts ih issue in the cause after
publication and knowledge of the former testimony, and even after
the hearing, but the allowance of it is not a matter of right
in the party, but of sound discretion in the court, to be exercised cautiously and sparingly and only under circumstances which
demonstrate it to be indispensable to the merits and justice of the
cause." The rule was founded on the public policy of suppressing
perjury and preventing the fabrication of evidence to meet the
exigencies of the cause after the full bearing and weight of the
testimony are understood by the parties: Gilb. For. Rem. 118,
119. But by the methods of modern practice in equity, the testimony is fully known to the parties, as it is put in and they are
apprised of its qualities and character, its weakness or its strength,
and its bearing on the case before publication, quite as completely
as they would be in a trial at law.
This consideration deprives the rule itself of much of its force
in modern application, and again, when the nisi prius character
of the trial of causes before the vice-chancellor is considered,
there is absolutely no ground for the application to the subject in
connection with such trials of a different rule from that which
would govern it at law. Speaking generally, neither equity nor
law will relieve where the newly-discovered facts are merely
Oumulative or corroborative, but the rule admits of exception, and
neither law nor equity will refuse relief where the evidence, though
cumulative, will make plain and certain that which was before
mysterious and doubtful. So that if it be received the most obvious justice will be done, and if rejected the most palpable injustice: 3 Gra. & Wat. on N. T. 1064. It may be that testimony
to ihe same effebt as that which is made the ground of the application has been given in the cause, but it may have been so slight as
to have been therefore unimportant. It may have been the mere
adumbration of a most important fact which, if fully proved, would
have turned the scale. 'Tle applicant may have been unable from
want of knowledge'of *the means or sources of proof to establish
the fact on the trial, and the evidence may have come to him by
the merest accident almost immediately afterwards. To say that
because evidence to the same effect was given in the cause, though
it was too weak to be of any value (but yet the best within the
applicant's knowledge or reach at the time), strong and, it may be,
thoroughly conclusive testimony subsequently discovered shall not
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avail him merely because of a rule which is within the control of
the court, would be to do injustice judicially and with deliberation.
If the newly-discovered evidence is of a different kind and character from that adduced on the trial it will not be liable to the
objection that it is cumulative: -uionv. Butts, 4 Wend. 579; G-ardnor v. Mitchell, 6 Pick. 114; Watts v. .Howard,7 Mete. 478, 480.
In the case before me the newly-discovered evidence consists of
statements made by the complainant to the witnesses that she had
conveyed the property in question to the defendant. The evidence
of admissions in the cause is very slight, and is not of the same
kind as that which is now offered. There can be no doubt of the
importance of the testimony to the defendant. The complainant's
case is based on her ignorance of the character of the deeds which
she executed, by which the property was conveyed to her son, the
defendant.
If, then, the newly-discovered evidence now offered is of a
character such as, under like circumstances, would be ground for &
new trial in an action at law, why should it not under the circumstances be admitted here? If there had been a trial at law, in an
action at law, between these parties, resulting in a judgment against
the defendant, and he had discovered the evidence only when too
late to avail himself of it at law, this court would have relieved
him on that ground. And shall it be said that its practice con.
strains it to perpetrate the injustice against which it would grant
relief if it occurred'in another forum ? The admission of the evidence is within the discretion of the court, and there it should rest
in order to guard against imposition on the one hand, and a failure
of justice on the other.
The testimony will be opened, under the direction of the vicechancellor, to admit the newly-discovered evidence, and to give
the complainant opportunity to meet it by counter evidence.

Supreme Court of Michigan.
EDWARD SMITH v. ALLAN SHELDON

ET AL.

After the dissolution of a partnership, even if it be conceded that the liquidating
partner has authority to give tn acknowledgment of debt in the firm name, yet ie
has no authority, by implication of law, to give a note in the firm name, which

increases the amount of the indebtedness, or extends the time of liability, or in
any way amounts to a new contract.
After the dissolution of a partnership, if one partner buys out the interest of
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the others, and agrees to assume the debts, he becomes, a's between the parties, the
principal debtor, and the retiring partners merely sureties, and creditors of the
firm having knowledge of this equity are bound to regard it in their subsequent
dealings with the parties.
. Where, after the dissolution of a firm under such circumstances, a creditor
accepted from the liquidating partner, without the knowledge of the others, a note
in the firm name, with interest at a special rate, the retiring partners were thereby discharged from the original debt.
This result was not varied by the fact that the note was at very short time, one
day, where the agreement for a high rate of interest showed an intention to give
indulgence beyond the time named, and such indulgence was, in fact, given until
the principal debtor became insolvent. These facts, while legally immaterial, have
a strong bearing on the equities, by showing that the creditor bargained for an
advantage that the sureties were not to share, and therefore they could not be compelled to share the risk.

ERROR to Wayne Circuit.
Prior to June 1867, Edward Smith, Isaac Place and Francis B.
Owen, were partners in trade under the firm name of Place, Smith
& Owen, and as such became indebted to defendants in error in the

sum of $969, on book account.
In

the month mentioned the firm was dissolved by mutual con-

sent, Place purchasing the assets -of his co-partners, and agreeing

to pay off the partnership liabilities, including that to the defendants in error.

On the second day of the following month Place informed the
defendants in error of this arrangement, and that he had taken the
•assets and assumed the liabilities of the firm, and they, without the
consent or knowledge of Smith and Owen, took from Place a note
for the amount of the firm indebtedness to them, payable at one
day with ten per centum interest. They did not agree to receive
this note in payment of the partnership indebtedness, but they

kept it and continued their dealings with Place, who made payments
upon it. The payments, however, did not keep down the interest.
Place, in 1872, became insolvent, and made an assignment, and
Smith was then called upon to make payment of the note. This
was the first notice he had that he was looked to for payment. On

his declining to make payment, suit was brought on the original
indebtedness and judgment recovered, which this writ was brought
to reverse.
. & TV'. 7.

Draper and C. I.

Walker, for plaintiff in error,

cited Stephens v. Thompson, 28 Vt. 77; Harriset al. v..Lindsay,
4 Wash. C. C. 98, 271; Smith v. Rogers, 17 Johns. 340 ; louldon
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v. Whittoclc, I Cow. 290; 1?osseau v. Call, 14 Vt. 83; Wraydell
v. Luer, 3 Dcnio 410; Livingston v. Radcliff, 6 Barb. 244; Van
.Eps v. Dillaye, 6 Barb. 532; King v. Lowry, 20 Id. 532;
Thurber v. Corbin, 51 Id. 215; Colgrove v. Tallman, 2 Lansing
97; Wilson v. Lloyd, Law Rep. 16 Eq. 60.
B. W. Meddaugh, for defendants in error.
1. Nothing short of an express agreement by creditors will discharge retiring partners: Parsons on Partnership 421; Story on
Part., sects. 154-6 ; Collyer on Part., 5th Am. ed., sects. 487, 568.
2. The promissory note of a third person, taken for an antecedent debt, is not a payment unless by agreement: Johnson v.
Weed, 9 Johns. 310 ; .Foley v. Barber, 5 Id. 68; Jaffray v.
Cornish, 10 N. H. 505; Davidson v. Bridgeport, 8 Conn. 472.
S. Taking note of another than the debtor is an extinguishment
of the debt only when so agreed: Jewitt v. Pleak, 43 Ind. 368.
Devlin v. Chamblin, 6 Minn. 468 ; .fotehin v. ,Secor, 8 Mich. 494 ;
Dudgeon v. Haggart, 17 Mich. 273. This involves the principle
under discussion. The question in both instances is, the creditor
having taken an obligation other than that of his debtors, whether
or not he thereby has lost his remedy against them. The rule for
determining this should be the same in both.
4. A note of the surviving member of a firm, given in adjustment
of a creditor's account against the firm, will not be deemed a payment of the account unless such is shown to have been the agreement:
Leach v. Church, 15 Ohio St. 169; Bowen v. Still, 49 Penn. St.
65 ; Van Bps v. .Dillaye, 6 Barb. 244 ; ,Spearv. Atkinson, 1 Ired.
262; Thompson v. Briggs, 28 N. H. (8 Foster) 40; Powell v.
Oharless, 84 Misso. 485 ; Keerl v. Bridgers, 18 Miss. (10 S. & M.)
612; Sneed v. Wiester, 2 A. K. Marsh. (Ky.) 277; Rayburn v.
Day, 27 Ill. 46; Tyner v. Stoops, 11 Ind. 22; Bonnell v. Chamberlin, 26 Conn. 487 ; Smith v. Rogers, 17 Johns. 340. Tlis question is touched upon in Botsford v. Kleinhaus, 29 Mich. 832.
That the mere acceptance of the promissory note of a less number
than all of the joint debtors 'will not discharge the joint liability,
see Drake v. Mitchell, 3 East 251 ; Tobey v. Barber,5 Johns. 68;
Johnson v. Weed, 9 Johns. 810; Thompson et al. v. Percival,5 B.
& Ad. 925; Reed v. White et al., 5 Esp. 122; -Evans v. Drummond, 4 Id. 92; Harrisv. Farwel.l, 15 Beav. 31.
The cases cited by plaintiff in error are all distinguishable.
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Most of them are merely affirmations of the rule that the acceptance
of the note of one partner will be a discharge of the others if such
is the agreenient of the creditor accepting it. This is conceded,
but it does not reach this case, where there was no such agreement.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
COOLEY, C. J.-The position taken by the plaintiffs below was
that, as they had never received payment of their bill for merchandise, they were entitled to recover it of those who made the debt;
the giving of the note which still remained unpaid being immaterial.
On behalf of Smith it was contended that by the arrangement
between Place and his. co-partners, the latter, as between the three,
became the principal debtor, and that from the time when the
creditors were informed of this arrangement they were bound to
regard Place as principal debtor, and Smith and Owen as sureties,
and that any dealing of the creditors with the principal to the
injury of the sureties would have the effect to release them from
liability; and it is further contended that the taking of the note
from Place, and thereby giving him time, however short, was in
law presumptively injurious.
Upon this state of facts the following questions have been argued
in this court :1. Was the note given by Place in the co-partnership name for
the co-partnership indebtedness, but given after the dissolution,

binding upon Smith and Owen?
2. If Smith and Owen were not bound by the note, were they
entitled to the rights of sureties ? And
3. Did the taking of the note given by Place discharge Smith
and Owen from their former liability?
On the first point it is argued in support of the payment tha
when a co-partnership is dissolved, the partner who is entrusted
with the settlement of the concern should be held to have implied
authority to give notes in settlement. On the other hand it is insisted that in law he has no such authority, and that if he assumes,
as was done in this case, to give a note in the partnership name, it
will in law be his individual note only.
Whatever might be the case if the obligation which was given
had been a mere acknowledgment of the amount due, in the form
of a due bill or I. 0. U., we are satisfied that there is no good reason for recognising in the partner who is to adjust the business of
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:

the concern, any implied authority to execute such a note as was
given in this case. This note was something more then a mere
acknowledgment of indebtedness, and it bore interest at a large
rate. It was in every respect a new contract. The liability of
the parties upon their indebtedness would be increased by it if valid,
and their rights might be seriously compromised by the execution
of paper payable at a considerable time in the future, if the partner entrusted with the adjustment of their concerns were authorized to make new contracts. It was assumed in . -H. Bank v.
Kercheval, 8 Mich. 506, 519, that the law was well settled that no
such implied authority existed; and we are not aware that this has
befoi4been questioned in this state. See Pennoyer v. David, 8
Mibh. 407. We think it much safer to require authority when
such obligations are contemplated, than to leave one party at
liberty to execute at discretion, new contracts of this nature, which
may postpone for an indefinite period the settlement of their concerns, when a settlement is the very purpose for which he is to act
at all.
For a determination of the question whether Smith and Owen were
entitled to the rights of sureties, it seems only necessary to point
out the relative positions of the several parties as regards the partnership debt. Place by the arrangement had agreed to pay this
debt and as between himself and Smith and Owen, he was legally
bound to do so. But Smith and Owen were also liable to the creditors equally with Place, and the latter might look to all three
together. Had they done so, and made collection from Smith and
Owen, these parties would have been entitled to demand indemnity
from Place. This we believe to be a correct statement of the relative
rights and obligations of all.
Now a surety, as we understand it, is a person who, being liable
to pay a debt or perform an obligation, is 'entitled, if it is enforced
against him, to be indemnified by some &ther person, who ought
himself to have made payment or performed before the surety -was
compelled to do so. It is immaterial in what form the relation of
principal and surety is established, or whether the credit is or is
not contracted within the two capacities, as is often the case when
notes are given or bonds taken. The relation is fixed by the
arrangement and equities between the debtors, and may be known
to the creditor or wholly unknown. If it is unknown to him, his
iights are in no manner affected by it; but if he knows that one
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party is surety merely, it is only just to require of him that in any
subsequent action he may take regarding the debt, he shall not
lose sight of the surcty's equities.
That Smith and Owen were sureties for Place, and the latter was
principal debtor after the dissolution of the co-partnership seems
to us unquestionable. It was then the duty of Place to pay this
debt and save them from being called upon for the amount. But
if the creditors, having a right to proceed against them all, should
take steps for the purpose, the duty of Place to indemnify and the
right of Smith and Owen to demand indemnity were clear. Every
element of suretyship is here present; as much as if, in contracting an original indebtedness, the contract itself has been made to
show on its face that one of the obligors was surety merely. As
already stated, it is immaterial how the fact is established, or
whether the creditor is or is not a party to the arrangement which
establishes it.
This view of the position of the parties indicates clearly the right
of Smith and Owen to the ordinary rights and equities of sureties.
The cases which have held that retiring partners thus situated are
to be treated as sureties merely, have attempted no change in the
law, but are entirely in harmony with older authorities which have
only applied the like principle to different states of facts, where
the relative position of the parties as regards the debt was precisely the same. We do not regard them as working any innovation whatever. The cases we particularly refer to are Oakeley v.
Passeller, 4 01. & Fin. 207; Wilson v. Lloyd, Law Rep. 16 Eq.
Cas. 60, and .Midlardv. Thorn, 56 N. Y. 402.
Andit follows as a necessary result from what has been stated
that Smith and Owen were discharged by the arrangement made by
the creditors with Place. They took his note on time, with knowledge that Place had become the principal debtor, and without the
consent or knowledge of the sureties. They thereby endangered
the security of the sureties and as the event has proved indulged
Place until the security became of no value. True, they gave but
very short time in the first instance; but, as was remarked by the
vice-chancellor in Wilson v. Lloyd, Law Rep. 16 Eq. Cas. 60, 71,
"the length of time makes no kind of difference." The time was
the same in Fellows v. Prentis, 3 Denio 512, where the surety
was also held discharged, and see Olcie v. Spencer, 2 Wheat. 253.
VOL. XXV.-38
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But that indulgence beyond the time fixed was contemplated
when the note was given, is manifest from the fact that it was
made payable with interest. In a legal point of view this would
be immaterial, but it has a bearing on the equities, and it shows
that the creditors received or bargained for a consideration for the
very indulgence which was granted, and which ended in the insolvency of Place. When they thus bargain for an advantage which
the sureties are not to share with them, it is neither right nor lawful for them to turn over to the sureties all the risks. This is the
legal view of such a transaction; and in most cases it works substantial justice.
The judgment must be reversed with costs, and a new trial
ordered.
Supreme Court of indiana, March 1877.
JAMES STANLEY v. SUTHERLAND & KEARNS, ADV'Rs.
A court of bankruptcy has no authority to order the sale of property alleged to
belong to a bankrupt, where it is in possession of another person claiming to be the
owner.
Section 5063 of the levised Bankrupt Act relating to the sale of disputed property and holding the proceeds to abide the result of the determination of title,
does not extend to cases where another person is in.possession under claim of title.
In cases to which that section does extend there must be notice to the claimant,
and without it the proceeding would be void as to him.
Property in the possession of A. under claim of title was seized by the sheriff
under an execution from a state cpurt as the property of B. A petition in bankruptcy was then filed against B. and subsequently an order was made by the Bankruptcy Court on the sheriff to deliver the property to B. 's assignee, which he did.
An action against the sheriff for trespass in taking the goods from him was
brought by A. after the petition in bankruptcy had been filed against B., but before the order to the sheriff to deliver the goods to the assignee. Hed, that the
delivery of the goods to the assignee under the order of the Bankruptcy Court was
no defence to the sheriff in such action.
In such an action it appeared that plaintiff's title was by purchase from the bankrupt with some knowledge of his affairs : Held, that the question was not whether '
the title of plaintiff was invalid under the Bankrupt Act, but whether it was good
or not under the state law. Neither the assignee nor any one entitled to question
tie validity of the sale under the Bankrupt Act being party to the action, the
Bankrupt Act had no application whatever.

FRom Cass Circuit Court. This was an action by George 0.
Sutherland against the appellant, Stanley, to recover a stock of
goods or the value thereof, a schedule of which was set out, alleged to
belong to the plaintiff and to have been in his possession, and to have
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been wrongfully and unlawfully taken from the plaintiff by the defendant, and converted to his own use. Issue, trial by jury,
verdict and judgment for the plaintiff.
M. Winfield and S. T. .McConnell, for appellant.
.D. P. Baldwin and .. B.

zcConnell, for appellees.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
C. J.-The appellant has assigned the following supposed errors :1. The court erred in overruling the demurrer to the complaint.
2. The court erred in overruling the demurrer to the fifth paragraph of reply.
3. The court erred in overruling the motion for a new trial.
4. The court erred in rendering final judgment for the appellee.
We do not discover any objection to the complaint, and as none
is pointed out in the brief of counsel for the appellant we assume
there is none.
We take the following statement of the other pleadings involved
from the brief of counsel for the appellant:"The first paragraph of the supplemental answer is in the nature
of a plea in abatement verified. It alleges that the defendant
seized the goods as sheriff on a writ of attachment issued against
the property of William Sutherland; that Sutherland was subsequently adjudicated a bankrupt on the petition of his creditors ;
an assignee was appointed, who obtained an order from the Bankrupt Court on him for the delivery of the goods; and on demand
of the assignee, and in obedience to the order of the Bankrupt
Court, he surrendered the goods to him, who still holds them, subject to the claims of the plaintiff, which he is ordered to and may
assert in that court, and he asked that this suit abate until then.
"A demurrer was overruled to this plea, and George replies that
he was not a bankrupt; that he purchased the goods in good faith
from the bankrupt without reasonable cause to believe him insolvent; that the conveyance to him was a preference of an honest
debt, and such a preference as was lawful under the laws of the
state ; that he was no party to the bankrupt proceedings and had
no notice thereof. A demurrer was overruled to this reply and
exceptions taken.
"The ruling on the demurrer to the reply was in effect a sustaining
WORDEN,
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a demurrer to the plea in abatement, and holding it simply a plea
in bar. This demurrer ought to have been sustained; and if the
facts contained in the plea of abatement were proven, the suit
ought to have abated. The facts alleged in the reply would not
evade that issue."
It may be proper here to state some dates not appearing in the
foregoing statement of the pleadings.
The writ of attachment against William Sutherland was issued
on or about May 1st 1870, on which the goods were seized by the
defendant.
On May 7th 1870 the petition in bankruptcy against William
Sutherland was filed.
On May 10th 1870 this action was commenced.
On June 3d 1870 William Sutherland was adjudged a bankrupt.
On March 14th 1871 the assignee was appointed, and on April
26th 1871 the order for the delivery of the goods by the defendant to the assignee was made.
We are of opinion that the answer sets up no legitimate matter, either in abatement or in bar of the action, and therefore that
the court committed no error in overruling the demurrer to the
reply. The reply was good enough for the answer.
The answer goes upon the theory that as the defendant, as sheriff, seized the goods as the property of William Sutherland at the
suit of attaching creditors, and as William Sutherland was afterwards adjudged a bankrupt; and as the Court of Bankruptcy had
afterwards made an order for the delivery of the goods by the
defendant to the assignee, which had been done in pursuance of
the .order, this suit ought to abate, and the plaintiff should prosecute his claim to the property in the Court of Bankruptcy.
We do not concur in this view of the question.
The plaintiff, when this action was commenced, had, according
to .the allegations of the complaint, a complete and perfect right
of action against the defendant, for taking and carrying away his
goods. The fact that the defendant seized the goods as the pro.
perty of William Sutherland under process against the latter,
cannot change the aspect of the question. If the property belonged
to the plaintiff as alleged in the complaint, the defendant can no
more justify the trespass than if he had seized the property without
color of authority.
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As has been said, at the time the action was commenced the
plaintiff had a complete and perfect right of action against thoL
defenidant; and he had a right to prosecute it in the court where
he commenced it.
At that time too, it may be observed, though it is perhaps immaterial, the defendant had still the possession of the property.
Subsequently, however, under an order of the Court of Bankruptcy, the defendant delivered the property to the assignee
of William Sutherland, a bankrupt. This was done under proceedings in bankruptcy to which .the plaintiff was in no way a
party. We are unable to see how this fact can have the effect of
abating the plaintiff's action, or of compelling him to lose the property or pursue it into the Court of Bankruptcy. We think he had
a right to prosecute his action to final judgment in the court
where he commenced it. The case is, in principle, much like that
of Peck v. Jenness, 7 How. 112. There Jenness, Gage & Co.,
brought an action against Peck & Bellows, in one of the New
Hampshire state courts, and issued an attachment by which they
acquired a lien on property attached, and a right to make their
debt out of it. Pending the action Peck & Bellows became bankrupt, and one Howland was appointed their assignee, who appeared
to the action, pleaded the bankruptcy, and alleged an order of the
Bankruptcy Court for the delivery of the attached property by the
sheriff to him. But the court, notwithstanding this order of the
Bankruptcy Court, gave judgment for the plaintiffs, to be levied of
the property attached. This judgment was affirmed by the Superior Court of Judicature of New Hampshire, whose decision was
affirmed by the Supreme Court of the United States.
Counsel for the appellant has called our attention to the case of
.Markson v. Haney, 47 Ind. 31. But that case is not in point
here. That case decides, in substance, that where a District Court
of the United States has first acquired jurisdiction over a bankrupt, that jurisdiction is plenary and exclusive ovdr the property
of the bankrupt, so long as the proceedings in bankruptcy are pending. To make that case applicable we should be compelled to
assume the very point in dispute, that is, that the property attached
was the property of the bankrupt. The plaintiff, in his complaint,
alleges that the property was his, and be had a right to have that
question tried in the court where he brought his action.
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The order for the delivery of the goods by the defendant to the
assignee, as exhibited in the answer, is as follows:"Comes now W. A. Bradshaw, assignee herein, and files his
petition duly verified, setting forth that of the assets of said estate
is a certain stock of goods, wares and merchandise, of the value
of $3000, which were seized under attachment against the bankrupt about the 7th of May 1870, by the sheriff of Cass county, in
said district, and are now in boxes at Logansport in said county,
and suffering loss in its present state; that one George C.
Sutherland, a son of the bankrupt, makes claim to said goods by
virtue of a pretended conveyance from his father of April 28th
1870, and he prays that said goods be removed to Indianapolis
and sold, and the fund held instead of the goods, to answer such
claim as the said George may establish; and it is thereupon
ordered that said assignee do remove said goods to the city of
Indianapolis forthwith, and sell the same promptly at auction for
cash, discharged of liens, holding the proceeds instead of the goods
to answer to such claim as may be established against them, first
giving notice of the time and place and terms of sale by advertising the same in the 'Daily Indianapolis Journal' and a paper of
general circulation printed at Logansport aforesaid."
Section 5063 of the Bankrupt Act (R: S. U. S. 983) provides
that "whenever it appears to the satisfaction of the court that the
title to any portion of an estate, real or personal, which has come
into the possession of the assignee, or which is claimed by him, is
in dispute, the court may, upon the petition of the assignee and
after such notice to claimant, his agent or attorney, as the court
shall deem reasonable, order it to be sold under the direction of
the assignee, who shall hold the funds received in place of the
estate disposed of; and the proceeds of the sale shall be considered
the measure of the value of the property in any suit or controversy
between the parties in any court. But this provision shall not
prevent the recovery of the property from the possession of the
assignee by any proper action commenced at any time before the
court orders the sale."
A construction was given to this section of the Bankrupt Act
in the case of Knight v. Cheney, 5 Bank. Reg. 305. In that case
the assignee of one Hunt claimed a stock of merchandise in the
possession of a certain firm doing business in the city of Providence, who refused to deliver the same to the assignee, claiming
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the goods by purchase from the bankrupt, and the assignee filed
his petition in the District Court, praying that a citation might issue
against the firm, and to the members composing it, requiring them
to show cause why the sale and transfer of the property should not
be adjudged void. The parties respondent to the proceeding
moved to dismiss the petition of the assignee, but the motion was
overruled and they were required to answer the allegations of the
petition.
On revising this decision in the Circuit Court, the judgment of
the District Court was reversed. Judge CLIFFORD, in delivering
the opinion of the court, said: "Perishable estate of the debtor
may be sold by order of the District Court under the direction of
the messenger or assignee, the fund received to be held in place
of the estate sold, and the provision is made in case the estate of
the debtor is liable to deterioration in value. Corresponding provision is also made in respect to the estate of the debtor which has
come into the possession of the assignee, or which is claimed h#
him, where it appears to the satisfaction of the court that the
title to the same is in dispute,* and the enactment is that "the
court may, upon the petition of the assignee," after reasonable
notice to the claimant, his agent or attorney, "order. it to be
sold under the direction of the assignee, the funds to be held in
place of the estate," as in the case of the sale of perishable property.
"Discretionary power, it must be conceded, exists in the District
Court to order a sale of the estate of the debtor, where it appears
that his title is in dispute, if it also appears that the debtor was in
possession of the estate at the time he was adjudged bankrupt, and
that the estate was duly transferred to the assignee, and that it
remained in his possession at the time the sale was ordered. Grant
that the power of sale under that section extends to such a case
as that supposed, stil the concession does not sustain the decision
of the District Court under revision, as the estate ifa
this case was
never transferred to the assignee, and was not'in his possession at
the time the order of sale was passed. On the contrary, it was in
the actual possession of the respondent firm, claiming absolute
title to and dominion over the same as their own property. Responsive to that suggestion, the proposition of the assignee is that
the estate in question is claimed by him as such assignee, and that
the power of sale extends to any portion of an estate to which the
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title is in dispute where the same is claimed by the assignee, as in
this case. Taken literally, the phrase" or which is claimed by him,"
would perhaps appear to afford some support to the theory of the assignee, but it is impossible to adopt that view, as it would authorize
the district judge, in the settlement of the estate of the bankrupt,
however small, to order the sale of the estate, if claimed by the
assignee, of every inhabitant of his judicial district, and to dircet
the assignee to hold the funds received from the sales in place of
the estates sold, and to compel the'owners in possession of the
same to appear in court and vindicate their titles, and to accept,
if successful, the proceeds of the sale as the value of their property.
Adopt that theory, and the constitution which was ordained to
establish justice becomes a mockery, as any man may be deprived
of his property i-ithout due process of law, and no man, where the
title to property is concerned, is entitled to a trial by jury, unless
he commences his action before the court orders the sale. Such a
theory, as applied to the facts of this case, is not only repugnant
to the constitution, but also to many other provisions of the Bankrupt Act, and especially to the third clause of the second section
of the act, which contemplates that such controversies shall be
prosecuted by an action at law, or a suit in equity, and gives concurrent jurisdiction to the Circuit and District Courts to hear and
determine the same as provided in the Judiciary Act. * * * **

* *

Viewed in any light, the court is of the opinion that the District
Court does not possess the power under that provision to order in a
summary way the sale of an estate, real or personal, although the
same is claimed by the assignee, even though the title to the same
is in dispute, if it also appears that the estate in question is in the
actual possession of a third person, holding the same as owner, and
claiming absolute title to and dominion over the same as his own
property, whether derived from the debtor before he was adjudged
bankrupt or from some other former owner."
Whether or not the defendant's alleged wrongful seizure of the
goods under the attachment was such a deprivation of the plaintiff's
possession as would, under the decision we have so largely quoted
from, authorize the order of sale, we need not determine.
It is very clear that under the section of the Bankrupt Law set
out, the claimant of the property is entitled to notice of any in.
tended application for such order, by the assignee. The case of
.niRg v. Cheney, supra, assumes that such notice is necessary.
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See also 31ark8on v. Haney, 1 Dillon 497, 510. The order of
sale in this case does not purport to have been made upon notice
to the plaintiff, though it recites that he claims the property. If
a notice might be presumed, still it might be controverted; and
the reply does controvert it, for it alleges that the plaintiff was
no party to the proceedings and had no notice of them. If the
answer might possibly be held good, as setting up this order of sale,
the reply is good, for it shows that the order was a nullity so far
as the plaintiff was concerned, for the want of notice to him.
We pass now to the questions arising on the motion for a new
trial. We make these extracts from the brief of counsel for the appellant, as containing a statement of the positions assumed by them.
".The 9th, 10th and 11th causes for a new trial involve the
same questions and may be considered together. The 9th cause
relates to evidence and the 10th and 11th causes to the instructions asked by the plaintiff and given by the court, and the instructions 'asked by the defendant and refused by the court.
Concerning the evidence objected to, the court, over the objectioft
of the defendant, allowed the plaintiff to prove by several witnesses
the general signification of the word ' insolvency,' as understood
among business men in the city of Logansport. Can there be any
doubt that this was an error ? Is the word ' insolvency,' as used
in the Bankrupt Act of 1867, a legal term to be construed by the
courts, or does it depend for its signification upon the varied opinions of men of different localities ? Has it one meaning in one
place and another meaning in another place? Are traders in New
York, Cincinnati and Indianapolis, selling merchandise to a trader
in Logansport, to be 'affected by the local signification of the word
at Logansport ? We think not. The word used in the act is for
the courts to construe. There can be but one construction as
applied to any kind of business, no matter where carried on.
"The 7th instruction asked for by the defendant was the
law
(Loop v. tartin, 13 Wall. 40; .Buchannanv. Smit, 16 I'd. 278),
and ought to have been given. The 7th, 9th, 10th, 11th and 12th
instructions asked for by the plaintiff and given by the court, were
clearly in conflict with those decisions and ought not to have been
given. We desire to call special attention to the 11th instruction
of the plaintiff. In substance the jury are instructed that although
George knew his father was embarrassed, yet supposed he had sufVOL. XXV.-39
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ficient property to pay his debts, he would not have reasonable
cause to believe him insolvent. This instruction is squarely in
conflict with the decisions of the Supreme Court (U. S.). Tested
by those decisions the condition in which the instruction assumes
George knew his father to be, made him insolvent within the meaning of the Bankrupt Law. This made George liable to its provisions and invalidated his title to this property."
It is thus seen that the objections so far made to the proceedings below are based upon the theory that the action was governed
by the Bankrupt Law; in other words, that if the sale of the goods
by William Sutherland to the'plaintiff was in violation of the
Bankrupt Law, the sale was void, and the plaintiff could not recover.
We are of a different opinion. We think the Bankrupt Law had
nothing to do with the question in issue. The assignee of the
bankrupt was not a party to the proceeding, nor was any one
before the court who was entitled to question the validity of the
transfer under the Bankrupt Law. Even an assignee could not go
into a state court to set aside a conveyance made by the bankrupt
in violation of the Bankrupt Act: Markson v. Haney, 47 Ind.
81-S7, and authorities there cited. A sale of goods may be made
in violation of the Bankrupt Law, and yet be entirely good under
the law of the state. The defendant in this action was not in a
condition that authorized him to question the validity of the sale
under the Bankrupt Law. The controversy here is substantially
between the plaintiff and the attaching creditors of William Sutherland. If the property was transferred by William Sutherland to
the plaintiff in violation of the Bankrupt Law, that furnished no
ground on which any part of the creditors of William Sutherland
could attach it; on the contrary, it was a conclusive reason why
they should not. Such attachment would defeat the end of the
Bankrupt Law, which is the distribution of the assets among all the
creditors, while the attachment would secure the assets to the attaching creditors and such others as might file their claims under it.
If property can be attached by creditors in a state court, because
it has been transferred by the debtor in violation of the Bankrupt
Law, then the Bankrupt Law may be administered in a state court
under the form of proceedings in attachment.
If the creditors of William desired to avail themselves of any
act of bankruptcy committed by him, they had a remedy by pro-

